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RACIAL INTEGRATION AS A 
COMPELLING INTEREST 
Elizabeth S. Anderson1 
The premise of this symposium is that the principle and 
ideal developed in Brown v. Board of Education2 and its succes-
sor cases lie at the heart of the rationale for affirmative action in 
higher education. The principle of the school desegregation 
cases is that racial segregation is an injustice that demands 
remediation. The ideal of the school desegregation cases is that 
racial integration is a positive good, without which "the dream of 
one Nation, indivisible"3 cannot be realized. Both the principle 
and the ideal make racial integration a compelling interest. The 
Supreme Court recognized these claims in Grutter v. Bollinger. 
However, it failed to take full advantage of them. It thereby 
failed to answer crucial questions that must be answered by poli-
cies subject to strict scrutiny. In this essay, I shall display the 
links tying Grutter to Brown, discuss the vulnerabilities of Grut-
ter in the absence of an explicit grounding in Brown, and demon-
strate how the affirmative action policy upheld in Grutter, when 
explicitly grounded in Brown, survives strict scrutiny. To under-
stand this argument, it is helpful first to explain the integrationist 
perspective that underlies it. 
I. THE CONTINUING CAUSES OF BLACK 
DISADVANTAGE 
The integrationist perspective begins with a diagnosis of the 
causal mechanisms that continue to systematically disadvantage 
blacks.4 Sixty years after Brown declared state-sponsored racial 
1. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. I thank Rick Hills and kiT Jones for helpful advice. 
2. 347U.S.483(1954). 
3. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
4. Blacks arc the main focus of race-based affirmative action programs and of 
most research into the causes of race-based disadvantage. I therefore focus on their situa-
tion. Other groups may be proper targets of affirmative action if they suffer disadvan-
tages analogous to those affecting blacks, or if they suffer from other disadvantages that 
15 
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segregation unconstitutional, and fifty years after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 banned racial discrimination in employment, 
blacks remain_ seriously disadvantaged on nearly every measure 
of well-being.' Given that discrimination and overt hostility to-
ward blacks have declined since these landmark legal events, 
what continues to keep blacks back? Two stubborn legacies of 
white supremacy play pivotal roles in sustaining black disadvan-
tage: segregation and racial stigma. 
Residential segregation is the norm for blacks of all socio-
economic classes in the United States.6 Segregation of neighbor-
hoods leads to segre~ation of public schools-levels of which in-
creased in the 1990s. Jobs, too, tend to be racially segregated.8 
Black segregation from the mainstream has profound socioeco-
nomic consequences. It isolates blacks from the predominantly 
white informal social networks that govern access to economic 
opportunities. It confines blacks to regions experiencing severe 
job decline, without adequate means of transportation to the 
white suburbs where jobs are being created.9 It deprives blacks 
of investment opportunities, because their homes do not appre-
ciate in value as white suburban homes do. 10 Lack of housing 
appreciation, in turn, undermines their access to the credit 
needed to start businesses. 11 Segregation multiplies and spreads 
affirmative action can n;medy. 
5. See Council of Economic Advisors for the President's Initiative on Race, 
Changing America: lndicawrs of Social and Economic Well-Being by Race and Hispanic 
Origin, 1998, http://www.access.gpo.gov/eop/calpdfs/ca.pdf for representative statistics. 
6. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 64 tbl. 3.1 (1993). Although based on 
1980 Census figures, this remains the definitive work on black residential segregation in 
the U.S. That segregation has declined only modestly in Census 2000 is confirmed by 
Lewis Mumford Center, Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind 
1-2, 5 (Dec. 18, 2<Xll ), http://mumfordl.dyndns.org/ccn2(XJO/WholePop/WPreport/page 1. 
html. 
7. Gary Orfidd & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare? 
18-19 (Jan. 2(X)4) http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/bruwn50.pdf. 
8. TIMOTHY BATES, BANKING ON BLACK ENTERPRISE: THE POTENTIAL OF 
EMERGING FIRMS FOR REVITALIZING URBAN ECONOMIES 140 (1993) (documenting high 
bctwcen-lirm segregation related to race of lirm owner); DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, 
GENDER AND RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB 
SEGREGATION 24 (1993) (documenting high within-lirm segregation). 
9. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Michael A. Stollet al., Within Cities and 
Suburbs: Racial Residential Concemration and the Spatial Distribution of Employment 
Opportunities Across Sub-Metropolitan Areas, 19 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 207 
(2()(Xl). 
10. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 150-1 (1995). 
11. THOMAS D. BOSTON, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
76-79 (1999). 
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the effects of employment discrimination, by filling blacks' social 
networks with people who have been similarly shut out of job 
opportunities. It concentrates and thereby multiplies poverty, 
exclusion, and disadvantage. Concentrated disadvantage reduces 
the tax base while increasing the demands on public services in 
cities where blacks live, resulting in higher tax burdens for 
poorer services-especially, worse schools-than what whites 
enjoy. 12 Segregation also impedes the formation of cross-racial 
political coalitions, by ensuring that public services devoted to 
black areas will have no spillover benefits for other groups. 13 
These consequences of de facto segregation affect middle class 
as well as poor blacks. 14 
A second broad cause of continuing black disadvantage is 
racial stigma- habits of racial classification, perception generali-
zation, and interpretation, and modes of identification that mark 
blacks as unworthy, undeserving, pathological, and alien-not 
fully "us. " 15 Slavery constituted blacks as a dishonored race; Jim 
Crow branded them as an untouchable caste. Although the overt 
hostility of such "old-fashioned" racism has waned, it has left 
behind subtler forms of systematic bias against blacks, residing 
more in cognitive than affective mechanisms, more unconscious 
than willingly avowed as such. 16 Pervasive sti9matization of 
blacks has been documented in survey research, 1 psychological 
experiments, 18 and content analyses of the media. 19 
12. See Thomas J. Phelan & Mark Schneider, Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Ameri-
can Suburbs, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 659, 673 (1996) (calculating that, controlling for differ-
ences in afllucncc, "black/multiethnic" suburbs pay 65'X, higher tax rates than white sub-
urbs); Ruth Hoogland DcHoog ct al., Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban 
Gheuos, 13 J. URB. AFF. 479,486-90 (1991) (concluding that suburban blacks had worse 
public scrvices when they lived in a majority black town as compared to a metropolitan 
government in which they were a minority). 
13. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 154-55. 
14. See John R. Logan, Separate and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks and 
Hispanics in Metropolitan America, 5-6, 13-14, 19, Oct. 13, 2(XJ2, http://mumfordl.dyndns. 
org!ccn2(XXJ/ScpUncq/SUReport!SURepPagd.htm (Lewis Mumford Center) (finding that 
due to segregation, middle-class blacks and Hispanics arc kss able than whites to move 
into middle-class neighborhoods, and so have less access than whites to the superior pub-
lic services available in such neighborhoods); MARY PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET 
FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 28-30 (1999) (not-
ing that proximity of black middle-class neighborhoods to poor neighborhoods means 
that "residential n;turns to being middle class for blacks arc far smaller than for middle-
class whites"). 
15. See GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002). 
16. See Linda Krieger, The Colllelll of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) 
(surveying research on cognitive racial biases). 
17. See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNNE M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR HJ6-20, 
272-76 (1996) (arguing that modern antiblack prejudice is a form of subtle racial n:sent-
18 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:15 
Racial stigma, besides constituting a profound expressive 
harm to blacks, has multiple deleterious material effects. It 
causes subtle forms of unconscious employment discrimination.20 
It underlies discrimination in consumer markets.21 It causes what 
Glenn Loury calls "discrimination in contact" -pervasive ten-
dencies of nonblacks to shun contact with blacks, or limit their 
contact to formal, arms-length relationships. 22 This shunning is 
manifested in such phenomena as white flight, low rates of in-
termarriage with blacks, the reluctance of nonblacks to adopt 
black children, and the exclusion of blacks from informal net-
works of association and mentorship that are so critical to educa-
tional and career advancement. Racial stigma therebr impairs 
the opportunities of blacks to develop their talents.-3 It also 
frames public discourse so as to characterize the disadvantages 
of blacks as "their" problem rather than "ours," as manifesta-
tions of biological inferiority or cultural pathology rather than 
externally imposed disadvantages. Such framings induce "racial 
negligence" on the part of political institutions: systematic fail-
ures to investigate the often grossly disadvantageous impact of 
public policies on blacks, and indifference to these impacts when 
they come to light. 24 Blacks' awareness of the ways they are 
stigmatized also causes material as well as psychological harm. 
"Stereotype threat" -stressful responses to situations in which 
blacks anticipate that their behavior might be judged as confirm-
ing a demeaning stereotype- impairs black performance on 
standardized tests and thereby limits their educational opportu-
mcnt); see also David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN 
CONTROVERSY (Phylis Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988). 
18. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Colltemporary 
Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in 
CONFRONTING RACISM 3, 3-8 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske cds., 1998) 
(showing how those \\<ho profess adherence to colorblind principles treat blacks less fa-
vorably than whites when their behavior is not monitored); A.G. Greenwald, D.E 
McGhee, & J.L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (document-
ing unconscious negative racial stereotypes in test subjects). 
19. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE 
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999) (finding that news media portray blacks as 
"'problem cases" for welfare out of proportion to their actual representation among such 
cases). 
20. See Krieger, supra note 16. 
21. IAN AYERS, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE 
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 29-33, 68-78 (explaining documented discrimination 
against blacks in retail car sales by stereotype-based statistical discrimination). 
22. LOURY, supra note 15, at 95-99. 
23. /d. at99-103. 
24. /d. at 80-82 (citing American indifference to vast disparities in rates of impris-
onment of blacks compared to other racial groups). 
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nities.25 There is also growing evidence that the psychological 
stress of stigmatization and its attendant daily humiliations-
which affects middle class26 as well as poor blacks- has deleteri-
ous effects on health.27 
Centuries of massive state and private racial discrimination 
created the segregation and racial stigma that so gravely disad-
vantage blacks today. But once established, these mechanisms 
are individually self-sustaining. De facto job segregation, by iso-
lating blacks from the social networks that could lead them out, 
begets more segregation.28 Racial stereotypes cause stereotype-
reinforcing habits of perception: greater readiness to notice 
stereotype-confirming than stereotype-defying features of 
blacks, lesser readiness to notice heterogeneity within the black 
population.29 Moreover, racial stereotypes, when they induce 
race-based differential treatment, can generate evidence that 
seems to confirm the stereotype. If taxi drivers are reluctant to 
pick up blacks for fear that they will be robbed, honest blacks 
may be more likely than black robbers to give up trying to hail 
taxis, leaving a pool of black taxi-hailers disproportionately 
comRosed of robbers-hence confirming the taxi drivers' stereo-
type.Jo 
Racial segregation and racial stigma are also mutually self-
reinforcing. Stigma causes white flight, which causes residential 
segregation. Job segregation introduces a racial element to man-
agers' stereotypes about those most fit for the job, which causes 
managers to hire people for the job whose race matches that of 
the incumbents.31 Thus, these mechanisms of systematic black 
disadvantage survive long past the end of formal state discrimi-
25. Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the lntellectllal Test 
Performance of African-Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 
26. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (documenting per-
sonal experiences of discrimination suffered by middle-class blacks); Joe Feagin, The 
Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. 
REV. 101 (1991) (same). 
27. See, e.g., Max Guyll, Karen A. Matthews, & Joyce T. Bromberger, Discrimina-
tion and Unfair Treatment: Relationship to Cardiovaswlar Reactivity Among African 
American and European American Women, 20 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 315 (2001) (finding 
that subtle race-based mistreatment raises the blood pressure of African American 
women). 
28. However, residential segregation could not persist without continuing housing 
discrimination. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, 96-109. 
29. Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 
CONTEMP. Soc. 319,321-22 (2000). 
30. LOURY, mpra note 15, at 30-31. 
31. BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
EMPLOYMENT 35-36 (1998). 
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nation and the waning of intentional, illegal private-sector dis-
crimination. They "lock in" the effects of past purposeful state 
and private discrimination, generate subtler forms of often un-
conscious and legal discrimination, and inflict myriad kinds of 
direct damage to blacks that are unmediated by any form of dis-
crimination. 
II. RACIAL INTEGRATION AS A 
REMEDY AND IDEAL 
No controversial or sophisticated moral assumptions are 
needed to recognize that the mechanisms of systematic racial 
disadvantage described above are deeply unjust. Segregation and 
racial stigma are the continuing effects of massive wrongdoing in 
the past. Justice requires that one not only cease intending to 
wrongfully injure others, but also dismantle any wrongfully es-
tablished mechanisms that continue to do damage even in the 
absence of a continuing intention to do so. This is not a matter of 
reparations for past wrongs. The wrongs are still happening. 
Even if current racial stigmatization and segregation were 
not caused by past wrongdoing, they would still be unjust. Racial 
stigmatization harms people on the basis of invidious stereotypes 
and other pernicious cognitive biases. Racial segregation violates 
even a weak principle of racial equality of opportunity, confined 
to the idea that one's racial status should not figure in causal 
mechanisms that put one at a profound disadvantage in access to 
opportunities. 
The real difficulty is not in judging that segregation and ra-
cial stigmatization are unjust, but in figuring out how to undo 
them. Current antidiscrimination laws are insufficient because 
much segregation and stigma are self-sustaining. Nor can such 
laws be extended to cover discrimination in contact, because that 
would violate individual rights to freedom of association in inti-
mate relations. States have limited power to prevent white flight. 
States do have the power to integrate their own institutions, 
especially the public schools. If racial segregation is the problem, 
then racial integration is a remedy. This remedy serves to correct 
injustices within the state and to ameliorate segregation in the 
wider world. The school-age and college years are a formative 
period of life, during which people form friendships, acquaintan-
ces, and habits of association that persist through adulthood. 
Students who have attended more racially integrated schools are 
more likely to have racially diverse friends, co-workers, and 
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neighbors than those who have attended racially homogeneous 
schools.32 Racial integration of schools is therefore a direct rem-
edy for the isolation from social networks that is a prime cause 
of black economic disadvantage, and an indirect spur to integra-
tion in other domains. 
Racial integration is also a remedy for stigmatization. By in-
tegration, I mean the joint participation on terms of equality of 
members of different racial groups in a social setting. According 
to the "contact hypothesis," prejudice is reduced by sustained, 
institutionally supported intergroup cooperation among equal 
status individuals (i.e., peers or co-workers). 33 Cooperation to-
ward a shared goal induces favoritism toward those in the coop-
erative group, which can override race-based biases.34 When 
people focus on achieving common goals with peers, they have 
reasons to search for and use individuating information about 
the cooperators, rather than relying on stereotypes.35 The par-
ticipation of more than token numbers of a stigmatized group in 
the cooperative enterprise thereby helps break down stereotypes 
and reduces discrimination against members of the group.36 Ra-
cial integration in a cooperative setting also facilitates the forma-
tion of interracial friendships and associations that have a life 
outside that setting. Even those who do not personally form such 
relationships become more racially tolerant when they know 
their friends have interracial friendships. 37 
Integration is not only a remedy for injustice. It is also part 
of the democratic ideal. Democracy is a system of collective self-
governance among equal citizens, in which we work out, collec-
tively and inclusively, our rules for living together in society. To 
enjoy democratic legitimacy, the terms of interaction through 
which we work out these rules must credibly claim to be rea-
32. J.H. Braddock & J.M. McPartland, The Social and Academic Consequences of 
School Desegregalion, 4 EQUITY & CHOICE 5 (1988); J.H. Braddock, M.P. Dawkins & W. 
Trent, Why Desegregale? The Effec/ of School Desegregmion on Adull Occupmional De-
segregalion of African Americans, Whiles, and Hispanics, 31 INT'L J. CONTEMP. Soc. 273, 
281 (1994 ). 
33. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE Of PREJUDICE 261-281 (1954). 
34. Reskin, supra note 29, at 324; see also SAML:EL L. GAERTNER, & JOHN F. 
DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMOI'. INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 
(2<XXJ). 
35. Reskin, supra note 29, at 324. 
36. Paul R. Sackett et al., Tokenism in Performance Evalumion: The Effec/s of 
Work Group Represell/alion on Male-Female and While-Black Differences in Perform-
ance Rmings, 761. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 263,265-66 (1991). 
37. Stephen C. Wright, Arthur Aron, Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, & Stacy A. Ropp, 
The Ex/ended Comac/ Effecl.· Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice, 73 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73 (1997). 
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sonably responsive to the legitimate concerns of all. To achieve 
such responsiveness requires a robust civil society, in which peo-
ple from different walks of life exchange their views about the 
problems they face, their interests, values, conflicts, hopes and 
fears. As Robert Post has argued, the "capacity to regard oneself 
from the perspective of the other ... is the foundation of the 
critical interaction necessary for active and effective citizen-
ship. "38 Given the realities of race in the U.S., people of different 
races occupy different walks of life. So in the U.S., democracy 
requires racial integration of the main institutions of civil society, 
the places where discussions of public import among citizens 
take place: public accommodations, workplaces, schools, and 
neighborhoods. 
The same point applies to society's elites, those who play a 
pivotal role in formulating and adopting policies of public im-
port. Elites, to be legitimate, must serve a representative func-
tion: they must be capable of and dedicated to representing the 
concerns of people from all walks of life, so that the policies they 
forge are responsive to these concerns. An elite drawn only from 
segments of society that live in isolation from other segments 
will be ignorant of the circumstances and concerns of those who 
occupy other walks of life. Moreover, when people from certain 
walks of life are not present to make claims, their interests and 
concerns are liable to be neglected. An elite that does not in-
clude members drawn from all walks of life will therefore be ig-
norant, irresponsible, and lack democratic legitimacy. In socie-
ties where one's race places one in a different walk of life, and 
where elites are not racially integrated, elites are liable to pro-
duce policies that are racially negligent. Democratic elites must 
therefore be racially integrated, lest they lack the competence 
and legitimacy to perform their representative function. 39 
In societies divided by racial segregation and stigmatization, 
competence in interracial interaction cannot be assumed. Stig-
matization breeds racial contempt; segregation breeds racial ig-
norance, distrust, and discomfort. Educating citizens for democ-
racy, and elites for their representative function, requires that 
38. Robert Post, /mroduction: to Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 23 (Robert Post & Michael Ragin cds., 1998). 
39. This argument docs not depend on the thought that only blacks can represent 
blacks. Such a thought would be disastrous, since it would entail that the function of 
white elites is to represent whites. Rather, elites as a whole arc charged with representing 
the people as a whole. They cannot competently perform this function without being ra-
cially inclusive. 
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such problems be overcome. This requires practice in social in-
teraction on terms of equality with individuals of different races. 
It therefore requires the actual participation on terms of equality 
of people of different racial status in elite institutions. Racial in-
tegration of elite educational institutions is therefore, in the con-
text of the ways race informs people's life circumstances and 
identities in the U.S. today, an imperative of both justice and 
democracy. 
III. FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: DEVELOPING 
THE INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE 
I have argued that racial integration of civil society is a 
morally and politically compelling interest. The same arguments 
support the claim that it is a constitutionally compelling interest. 
This is the conclusion of Grutter v. Bollinger, which develops the 
integrationist ideal emerging from Brown v. Board of Educatton. 
In tracing Grutter to Brown and not just Bakke,40 I emphasize its 
expansive scope and broad justification, rooted in concerns of 
social justice and democracy. The "diversity" defense of affirma-
tive action, articulated in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, limits 
integration to those cases in which it can be shown to yield edu-
cational benefits. Grutter advances a more robust integrationist 
perspective, which affirms racial integration as a compelling in-
terest apart from its educational benefits. It therefore returns to 
the integrationist tradition of Brown and its successors, without 
explicitly grounding itself in that tradition. 
Let us first trace the development of the integrationist per-
spective in the desegregation cases. Brown found that- de facto 
racial segregation was harmful to blacks, and that de jure segre-
gation was stigmatizing.41 These harms were the basis of the 
Court's holding that "separate but equal" schools are "inher-
ently unequal"42 and hence a violation of Equal Protection. 
However, Brown II did not even mention segregation, calling 
only for the elimination of "discrimination" by the public 
schools.43 It therefore left open the question of whether the 
state's obligation was simply to end its own racial discrimination, 
40. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (l 978). 
41. Brown V. Bd. or Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("Segregation of white and 
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The 
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races 
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.'')_ 
42. !d. at 495. 
43. Brown v_ Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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or to actually dismantle se~regation. Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County 4 settled this question. It held that 
school boards found to have practiced de jure segregation could 
not fulfill their constitutional obligation simply by ending the 
practice of assigning children to schools on the basis of race, 
while handing off the job of maintaining segregation to the pri-
vate choices of students and their parents. They had an "affirma-
tive duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to 
a unitary [i.e. integrated] system."45 The "constitutionally re-
quired end" is "the abolition of the system of segregation and its 
effects."46 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, the Court held that this end could justify the assignment of 
teachers and students to schools on the basis of their race.47 It 
thereby declared that the ideal of colorblindness is subordinate 
to the equal protection demand to abolish segregation and its ef-
fects. 
Some post-Brown desegregation cases also acknowledged 
integration as a democratic ideal, and the special role schools 
play in advancing this ideal. In Swann, the Court acknowledged 
that, while courts lacked the authority to order schools to pursue 
racial integration for its educational benefits, 
[ s ]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad 
power to formulate and implement educational policy, and 
might well conclude, for example, that, in order to prepare 
students to live in a pluralistic society, each school should 
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting 
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an 
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of 
school authorities .... 48 
In Keyes, Justice Powell, writing in partial concurrence, claimed 
that 
44. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
45. !d. at 437-38 (rejecting "freedom of choice" plan for assigning students to 
schools). 
46. /d. at440, quoting Bowman v. County School Board, 382 F.2d 326,333 (4th Cir. 
1967) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). 
47. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. 1, 19,28 (1971) 
(rejecting claim that the Constitution requires teachers to be assigned to schools on a 
"color blind" basis, when de jure teacher assignments had enabled schools to be racially 
identified; rejecting "racially neutral" student assignments when they "fail to counteract 
the continuing effects of past school segregation" and requiring race-conscious "affirma-
tive action" to achieve desegregation). 
48. /d. at 16. 
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In a pluralistic society such as ours, it is essential that no racial 
minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that stu-
dents of all races learn to play, work, and cooperate with one 
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in 
this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from ex-
ceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the 
values of an integrated school experience.49 
25 
This passage endorses both the antistigmatization and democ-
ratic education arguments for racial integration. 
Justice Powell's views on school desegregation are particu-
larly important because Powell devised the diversity defense of 
affirmative action. In Keyes, Powell characterized the constitu-
tional right found in Brown and its successors as an affirmative 
right to racial integration: 
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause, to expect that ... local school boards will 
operate integrated school systems within their respective dis-
tricts. This means that school authorities ... must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward en-
hancing integrated school opportunities. 50 
Powell advanced this view in the context of an extended argu-
ment that the distinction between de jure and de facto segrega-
tion be abandoned.51 
Had the Court accepted Powell's view of the constitutional 
irrelevance of the distinction between de fact and de jure segre-
gation, Powell's case for affirmative action in higher education 
could have been more straightforward. In Bakke, Powell could 
have argued that, in practicing affirmative action in admissions, 
colleges and universities are simply fulfilling their Constitutional 
duty to "implement their customary decisions with a view to-
ward enhancing integrated school opportunities." But since the 
de jure/de facto distinction remained in force, and the Davis 
Medical School had not been found to have violated the Consti-
tutional prohibition on de jure segregation, it had no constitu-
tional duty to integrate its student body. 52 
49. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) 
50. !d. at 225-26. 
51. !d. at 222-25. 
52 Regents of the Umv ol CaL V. Bakke, 438 U.S 265, 3lXJ-01 (1978) (rcJectmg 
the analogizing of Dav1s Med1cal School's alhrmallvc actiOn case to school desegregatiOn 
cases because m the former, "there was no JUdiCial dctcrmmat10n of constitutional v1ola-
tion as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification"). 
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Powell held instead that colleges and universities have a 
constitutional right, following from their First Amendment right 
to academic freedom, to promote "a diverse student body. "53 He 
tied this compelling interest in "diversity" to the need to educate 
an elite for national leadership. Observing the connection be-
tween diversity in the student body and opportunities of students 
"to learn from their differences,"54 Powell concluded that "the 
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide ex-
posure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Na-
tion of many peoples."55 This diversity argument is congruent 
with the integrationist argument that elites in a democratic soci-
ety, in which racial ascriptions and identities place people in dif-
ferent walks of life, need to be educated in racially integrated 
settings. In other words, "diversity" is another way of talking 
about integration. This was understood at the time Bakke was 
litigated.56 Powell's diversity argument is continuous with his 
claim in Keyes that schools have a compelling interest in "pro-
moting the values of an integrated school experience." 
When Powell sought to specify more concretely the educa-
tional benefits of diversity, he argued that people of different 
races may bring perspectives that elites need to know if they are 
to competently serve a diverse population: 
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise 
qualified medical student with a particular background-
whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or dis-
advantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine 
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its 
student body and better equip its graduates to render with 
understanding their vital service to humanity. 57 
53. /d. at 311-12. 
54. /d. at 312-13 n.48 (quoting William Bowen, then President of Princeton Univer-
sity). 
55. /d. at 313. 
56. Justice Brennan represented the Harvard admissions plan, which Powell cited 
as an exemplar of "diversity," as aiming "to achieve an integrated student body." ld at 
326 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Tobrincr of 
the California Supreme Court, dissenting in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 
Cal. 3d 34 (1976), identified the defendant's purpose as "the attainment of a racially inte-
grated, diverse medical school student body." /d. at 66. Tobriner connected the diversity 
rationale to the integrationist aim of Brown, complaining of the "sad irony" that "the 
first admission program aimed at promoting diversity ever to be struck down under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the program most consonant with the underlying purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment," one of which he just identified, in the previous sentence, as 
"the promotion of integration." /d. 
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
2004] RACIAL INTEGRATION 27 
This is an application of the integrationist argument that the na-
tion's elite needs to be racially integrated if it is to avoid racial 
negligence. 
Although Powell's diversity argument shared some conti-
nuities with the integrationist perspective, it altered the path of 
school integration in three key ways. First, "diversity" includes 
race as but one factor among others. It follows that schools may 
not, under the diversity defense, administer a preferential admis-
sions system in which race is the only diversity factor consid-
ered.58 Second, Powell's diversity argument divorced educational 
from social justice concerns. It follows that schools may seek ra-
cial diversity by means of racial preferences even if this is not 
needed to undo the causes of racial injustice, so long as diversity 
advances other educational goals. Third, Powell's argument ex-
cluded integrationist practices intended to advance racial justice 
in ways that do not operate through the educational benefits of 
diversity. Under the diversity defense, schools may seek integra-
tion to promote educational remedies for racial injustices-for 
example, to break down racial stereotypes, make information 
about the differential racial impact of policies salient, and pro-
mote competence in interracial engagement. But the diversity 
defense does not support the use of race to effect noneduca-
tional remedies-for example, to remedy de facto segregation. 
Powell's detachment of the diversity argument from explicit 
concerns of racial justice had enormous cultural consequences. 
His substitution of "diversity" for "integration" and its associ-
ated muting of concerns about racial justice set the stage for a 
vast expansion of the perceived uses of "diversity." Diversity-
related programming exploded. Most importantly, "diversity" 
escaped the confines of Powell's original educational rationale. 
Other institutions, such as leading corporations, correctional in-
stitutions, and the military, began to practice "diversity." In 
Powell's scheme, schools were uniquely entitled to use racial 
preferences to promote diversity because they could cite another 
constitutional right, their First Amendment right to academic 
freedom, which justified the use of race.59 Noneducational insti-
tutions offered other rationales for diversity- the need to stay 
globally competitive,60 to secure the obedience of black inmates 
58. !d. at 314-15; Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir.) (rejecting Boston 
Latin School's admissions program for failure to consider nonracial diversity factors). 
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
60. Brief of Amicus Curiae, General Motors Corp., Grutter v. Bollinger, 534 U.S. 
306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). 
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in correctional "boot camps,"61 to enhance the effectiveness of 
the military.62 
Thus, when the Supreme Court reconsidered the diversity 
defense in Grutter, it packed a greater variety of claims into "di-
versity" than Powell ever imagined. On its surface, Grutter 
merely reaffirmed Bakke in holding that affirmative action is jus-
tified to obtain "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body. "63 Yet, in arguing that the interest in these bene-
fits is compelling, Grutter appealed to the interests of the wider 
society. It allowed selective schools to piggyback their own di-
versity defense on the demand of other institutions, notably the 
military and leading corporations, for a racially diverse, highly 
educated elite to staff their positions.64 Grutter also highlighted 
racial integration as both an educational remedy for racial injus-
tice and as an ideal in itself. Regarding integration as an educa-
tional remedy, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, accepted 
the University of Michigan Law School's claims that a racially 
diverse student body "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' 
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] 
to better understand persons of different races."' 65 Diversity 
thereby "'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society. "'66 
O'Connor's most significant new focus, however, was on the 
importance of racial integration over and above its educational 
benefits. In part this reflects a concern with the legitimacy of the 
elite: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership 
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society 
must have confidence in the openness and inte~rity of the 
educational institutions that provide this training.6 
6 I. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir.). 
62. Consolidated Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton et al., Gruttcr 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2!Xl3) (No. 02-241, 02-516). 
63. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003). 
64. /d. at 33 I. 
65. /d. at330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a). 
66. /d. at 331 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae, American Educational Research As-
sociation ct al. 3). Strangely, O'Connor docs not cite Swann in support of the same 
proposition. 
67. /d. at 332. 
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Integration of elite institutions is also necessary to ensure that 
opportunities for success at the highest level are effectively open 
to all racial groups: 
Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must 
be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race 
and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous soci-
ety may participate in the educational institutions that pro-
vide the training and education necessary to succeed in Amer-
. 68 1ca. 
Most importantly of all, racial integration is an ideal in itself: 
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic 
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream 
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. 69 
These last three rationales depart from Powell's exclusive focus 
on the educational benefits of diversity. They do not justify di-
versity as advancing educational goals at all. Rather, they affirm 
the integrationist perspective that opened this paper. Notwith-
standing its diversity rhetoric, Grutter expands upon the full-
blooded integrationist ideal developed by Brown and its succes-
sors. 
IV. THE VULNERABILITIES OF GRUTTER AND 
THEIR SOLUTION IN BROWN 
O'Connor's ostensible reliance on Powell's diversity ration-
ale for affirmative action left her opinion vulnerable to two types 
of objection raised by the dissenting justices in Grutter. The first 
focuses on the ways the diversity defense licenses racial prefer-
ences for purposes unconnected to racial justice and democracy. 
The second focuses on the failure of the diversity defense to 
meet strict scrutiny. Both defects can be corrected by resituating 
Grutter's defense of affirmative action in the integrationist tradi-
tion following Brown. 
Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's holding in part 
because "marginal improvements in legal education do not qual-
ify as a compelling state interest. "70 If they did, then they could 
equally well justify racial segregation. In support of this claim, 
Thomas cited studies suggesting that black students learn less in 
68. !d. at 332-33. 
69. !d. at 332. 
70. /d. at 357. 
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racially diverse settings than in all-black schools.71 His point was 
that goals unconnected to the pursuit of racial justice can easily 
be turned against that pursuit. If white students' standardized 
test scores were marginally improved in a racially homogeneous 
setting, no one would accept that these educational benefits 
would be sufficiently compelling to entitle a school to discrimi-
nate against minority applicants. This double-edged sword ap-
plies as well to the corporate use of "diversity" to enhance global 
competitiveness. If corporations found that assigning only Asian-
American employees to do business in Asia enhanced their 
global competitiveness, no one would accept this as a justifica-
tion for barring blacks and Hispanics from those assignments. 
The diversity defense, whether limited to educational set-
tings, as Justice Powell intended, or expanded in service of cor-
porate goals, as Justice O'Connor allows, has no answer to the 
double-edged sword. The integrationist defense, by contrast, can 
exclude racial segregation as a permissible means toward educa-
tional and corporate goals. It limits compelling educational goals 
to those that are specifically linked to remedying racial injus-
tice-e.g., breaking down stereotypes-and promoting integra-
tion as a democratic ideal-e.g., teaching people to interact 
competently across racial lines. It does not permit corporate 
goals to be pursued at the expense of integration. 
The second vulnerability of Grutter lies in its deference to 
schools practicing affirmative action.72 Dissenting Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas repeatedly complained 
that Grutter's deference was unprecedented and incompatible 
with strict scrutiny.73 Had O'Connor situated her opinion in the 
context of the school desegregation cases, she could have shown 
that the dissent was mistaken. Deference to the greater expertise 
71. !d. at 364. Thomas' suggestion that black beneficiaries of affirmative action 
would he better off at Historically Black Colleges is belied by the best studies of this is-
sue. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
61, 114-15, 143-45, 1'!9 (1998) (finding that blacks admitted to more selective schools 
graduate and attain advanced degrees at higher rates, earn higher incomes, and report 
higher satisfaction with their college experience than comparably qualified black students 
at less selective schools). HBC's do an extraordinary job for their students, hut their pro-
grams arc mainly geared toward black students with substantially lower educational 
preparation than the black students who attend selective schools, and so for the most 
part cannot offer the latter the challenging curricula they need, and get, at selective 
'chools. 
72. Gmtter, 53'! U.S. at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of 
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions."). 
73. !d. at379-80, 386 (Rchnquist); at387, 3'!3 (Kennedy); at 350,361 (Thomas). 
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of school authorities and to the value of local control have been 
the constitutional norms in judging whether schools already 
found guilty of practicing unconstitutional de jure segre~ation 
are complying with Brown's requirement to desegregate. 4 In-
deed, the dissenters in Grutter have repeatedly insisted on the 
doctrine of deference to school authorities in desegregation 
cases, even though their conduct is subject to strict scrutiny.75 
Although O'Connor's deferential approach was historically 
consistent, it missed an opportunity to legitimize affirmative ac-
tion by demonstrating that it can meet the demands of a more 
rigorous and skeptical examination. Strict scrutiny of racial clas-
sifications demands that the use of race be narrowly tailored to 
fit the state's compelling interest. The dissenters argued that the 
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy 
failed narrow tailoring requirements in several areas: (1) in the 
relative weight given to admission of each of the groups granted 
preference; (2) in operating racial quotas that are indistinguish-
able from unconstitutional racial balancing; and (3) in the con-
sideration of race-neutral alternatives. In each case, Grutter 
could have met the narrow tailoring challenge had it appealed to 
precedents set by the school desegregation cases. 
(1) Relative weights given to members of preferred racial 
groups. Justice Rehnquist observed that the University of Michi-
gan Law School systematically preferred African-American ap-
plicants to Hispanic applicants with at least equal qualifications, 
to the point where it had a "critical mass" of African-Americans 
nearly twice the size of that for Hispanics. This preference is in-
compatible with the diversity defense, which holds that a "criti-
cal mass" of each disadvantage racial group may be pursued for 
educational objectives only.76 Shouldn't it take as many Hispan-
ics to break down Hispanic stereotypes against them, as it takes 
African-Americans to break down stereotypes about blacks? 
The diversity defense, because it ties the significance of race to 
its educational effects, has no answer to Rehnquist's objection. 
74. See Wendy Parker, What School Desegregation Teaches Affirmative Action, 
Wake Forest Puhlic Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 
03·13, Aug., 2003, http://ssrn.com/ahstract=439141. 
75. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (majority opinion hy Rehnquist, 
joined by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-
90 (1 992) (majority opinion hy Kennedy, joined hy Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Souter) 
(Justice Thomas took no part in the case); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 
(1991) (majority opinion hy Rehnquist, joined by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and 
White). See generally Parker, supra note 74. 
76. Bakke, 539 U.S. at 381. 
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Suppose instead that we based Grutter on an integrationist 
defense of affirmative action. Then the groups to be included in 
affirmative action preferences are those groups who currently 
suffer systematic disadvantage due to substantial de facto segre-
gation from the mainstream. African-Americans, Hispanics, and 
Native Americans fit this criterion. The objective of affirmative 
action is to remedy this segregation and its effects. The weight 
given to this objective for each group is tied to the urgency of 
each group's need for integration-that is, the degree of severity 
of the segregation they suffer. African-Americans are the most 
extremely segregated racial group in the U.S.; Hispanics are 
next. 77 This justifies the greater weight the Law School gave to 
African-American over Hispanic admissions. 
(2) Quotas and racial balancing. Rehnquist and Kennedy 
charged that the tight correlation between the percentage of 
each minority group in the applicant pool and the percentage of 
total offers granted to each minority group shows that the Law 
School was engaged in unconstitutional racial balancing.78 This 
complaint confuses ends with means. Racial balancing cannot be 
a legitimate end in itself, because it amounts to racial discrimina-
tion for its own sake.79 But the school desegregation cases do ac-
cept racial balancing as a means to other goals, including dis-
mantling segregation and promoting democratic ideals of living 
together in a pluralistic society.80 It is impossible to tell, simply 
by looking at admissions figures, whether a school is actually 
seeking racial balance,81 and if so, whether this is an end in itself 
or a means to another goal. One must examine what the school 
does with the diversity it achieves in the student body to assess 
77. See Lewis Mumford Center. supra note 6, al 1 (reporting !hal at currenllrends 
of black integration, il would "lake forty more years for black-while segregation lo come 
down even to the current level of Hispanic-while segregation"). 
78. Bakke, 539 U.S. 306,383 (Rehnquisl), 2371 (Kennedy). 
79. ld. at 307. 
80. Swann v. Charlolle-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S., 16, 28. The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appcals rejected racial balancing as a permissible means toward diversity, 
abscnl a showing !hal racial proportional rcprcsenlalion was nceded for specifically edu-
cational goals. Wessman v. Gillens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-98 (lsl Cir. 1998). However, as a 
means toward desegregation, il remains constitutional. I argue below, part V, that claims 
lothc contrary arc bascd on a confusion between the powers of Federal Courts and other 
slate bodies to implcmcnl remedies for segregation. 
81. Kennedy's inference is unwarranted because it ignores the dynamic effects of a 
school's admissions policies on its pool of applicants. Suppose applicants from each racial 
group have roughly similar risk aversion-that is, suppose the mcdian threshold prob-
ability of rejection, above which they would not apply to an institution, is the same for 
each racial group. Then the percentage of students from each racial group in the pool of 
admillcd students will mirror their proportion in the applicant pool, regardless of a 
school's admissions goals. 
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its objective. If it fails to use that diversity to spur interracial dis-
cussion and cooperation then the inference that the school is op-
erating an unconstitutional racial spoils system may be correct. 
But if it promotes actual integration-i.e., interracial coopera-
tion and dialogue- then it is using racial balancing as a tool, not 
as an end in its self. 
(3) Race-neutral alternatives. It is not impossible to racially 
integrate a law school, or any other school, using race-neutral al-
ternatives. What is impossible under current conditions is doing 
so, consistent with a selective admissions system. Thus, to defend 
its system of racial preferences in admissions, the University of 
Michigan Law School had to argue that it had a compelling in-
terest in two goals: racial diversity and selectivity. Justice Tho-
mas argued that having a law school at all, much less an elite law 
school, cannot be a compelling interest.82 Therefore, if it wants 
racial diversity, it should sacrifice selectivity. 
Thomas' argument that states have no compelling interest in 
having law schools is unpersuasive. States have a compelling in-
terest in fulfilling their constitutional functions, and thus in any 
conditions instrumentally necessary to fulfilling their functions. 
Among these functions is the administration of the laws. One 
cannot administer laws without trained lawyers, and hence not 
without law schools. By contrast, Thomas' argument that the 
University of Michigan Law School's desire to maintain its elite 
status does not constitute a compelling interest is correct.83 The 
desire of a school to maintain an elite reputation cannot justify 
racial discrimination. If it could, then if its elite reputation rested 
on its racial homogeneity, it could assert a compelling interest in 
discriminating against racial minorities. This is another instance 
of the double-edged sword. 
Against this, defenders of diversity can justly complain that 
it is unfair to characterize the interest at stake in Grutter as 
merely reputational. The state's compelling interest is in having 
an elite educated to the highest standards. When a school softens 
its admissions standards across-the-board to achieve diversity, it 
will end up admitting a student body that is, by and large, not 
prepared for the most advanced courses. It will therefore need to 
shift resources toward less challenging courses, at the cost of ad-
vanced courses. Hence, to promote learning at the most ad-
vanced levels, educational systems need selective schools. This 
82. Cruller, 539 U.S. at 358-59. 
83. /d. at 360. 
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reply does not fully meet Thomas' objection, however. Insofar as 
diversity is held to be compelling only as an educational interest, 
why must the same schools that specialize in diversity education 
also specialize in the most advanced education? Even if the state 
educational system as a whole has compelling interests in both, it 
does not follow that each school taken individually does. 
To answer this objection, we must look beyond the purely 
educational goods at stake-and hence beyond the diversity de-
fense-to the wider, noneducational, democratic purposes 
served by elite education. The integrationist defense identifies 
these purposes as having an elite that is legitimate, representa-
tive, and competent to serve the interests of citizens from all 
walks of life. To advance these compelling interests, the elite must 
not only be racially integrated; its diverse members must be edu-
cated together. 84 Only so can they develop competence in inter-
racial interaction. Only so can they develop a shared responsive-
ness to the interests of citizens from all walks of life. So long as 
responsiveness to the interests of different racial groups is di-
vided among elites according to their race, rather than taken up 
as a shared responsibility, this Nation will continue to be divided 
into de facto racial blocs. "The dream of one Nation, indivisible" 
therefore requires that the same institutions that provide ad-
vanced education to elites also practice racial integration. This 
dream is not reducible to "diversity" conceived as an instrument 
for advancing purely educational goals. It is the full-blooded in-
tegrationist ideal itself, extended to civil society as a whole. 
Justice Thomas suggested that even if these points were 
conceded, it is still ROssible to integrate selective schools using 
race-neutral criteria.85 Even if we ignore the dramatic drops in 
the enrollment of blacks entailed by using ostensibly "race-
neutral" criteria of admission,86 Thomas' claim is still question-
able. Facially race-neutral admissions criteria have succeeded 
even this much only because they have been selected for their 
84. Cf. Sam Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
669, 682 (1998) (arguing that race-conscious admissions is the only way universities can 
pursue their dual mission of achieving national excellence and integrating all groups into 
the nation's elite). 
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361. 
86. Thomas noted a 30% drop in black students at Boalt Hall after the passage of a 
referendum banning affirmative action in California. ld. at 366-67. The University of 
Texas Law School suffered a 64% drop in black students from 1997-2001, due to the ban 
on affirmative action imposed by Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, American Educational Research Association ct al., Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-228). 
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racially differential impact. But the distinction between using an 
overt racial classification for its differential racial impact, and us-
ing a proxy for race to achieve the same impact, is a distinction 
without a difference. Thomas acknowledged as much in con-
demning Columbia University's use of race-neutral intelligence 
tests to reduce the number of Jews it admitted.87 The same point 
works in reverse. If it is acceptable to select race-neutral criteria 
to increase the representation of disadvantaged racial groups in 
the student body, it is acceptable to aim at this goal directly, us-
ing racial classifications.88 Racial means are inherently the most 
narrowly tailored means available to achieve this goal. 
V. GRUTTER AS THE CULMINATION OF BROWN 
I have argued that Grutter is more effectively defended by 
appeal to Brown and its successor cases than by appeal to Bakke 
alone. Grutter also represents the culmination of an integration-
ist perspective whose development was cut short in later succes-
sor cases to Brown. Against the claim that Gruffer develops the 
principle of Brown, it might be thought that Brown and its suc-
cessors are limited to the claim that the state has a compelling 
interest in remedying de jure segregation. By contrast, Grutter 
affirms that the state has a compelling interest in remedying de 
facto segregation, and in pursuing integration as a democratic 
ideal. Since it is assumed that de jure segregation is largely con-
signed to the past, Brown and its successors might be thought to 
be irrelevant to Grutter. 
However, the supposed gap between de jure and de facto 
segregation is smaller than it appears. When a state has violated 
equal protection, the Constitution demands not just that the vio-
lations cease, but that the effects of past violations be elimi-
nated.89 Furthermore, states have a compelling interest in avoid-
87. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 369 ("Columbia employed intelligence tests precisely be-
cause Jewish applicants, who were predominantly immigrants, scored worse on such 
tests. Thus, Columbia could claim (falsely) that '"we have not eliminated boys because 
they were Jews and do not propose to do so."'). 
88. Kathleen Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1054. Some 
may still have the nagging feeling that the usc of explicit racial preferences to achieve a 
permissible race-conscious goal is objectionable. I argue that this feeling is groundless in 
Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrwiny, 77 NYU L. REV. 1195, 1231-37, 1266-
70 (2002). See also LOURY, supra note 15 at 133-41, 148-54, for different arguments to-
ward a similar conclusion. 
89. Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (The "con-
stitutionally required end" is "the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects.") 
(emphasis added). Cf Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
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ing "passive participation" in private racial discrimination.90 De 
facto school segregation is both a continuing effect of past de 
jure segregation, and reflects the transmission of private racial 
discrimination into its own institutions. Schools therefore have a 
compelling interest in remedying it. 
The Supreme Court recognized this point in early desegre-
gation cases. Green held that schools guilty of de jure segregation 
had not fulfilled their duties by ceasing their own racial discrimi-
nation, if their schools remained de facto segregated due to their 
transmission of individually legal but racially discriminatory 
choices of students and their parents.91 Swann held that schools 
are constitutionally responsible not only for undoing the direct 
segregative effects of their own discrimination, but for the indi-
rect effects their segregative actions have on private housing 
choices.92 Similarly, in Keyes, the Court held Denver responsible 
for desegregating its entire school system, even though proof of 
segregative intent was shown only for a small portion of its 
schools. This was in part because segregation of one part of the 
district's schools indirectly influenced the racial composition of 
the other schools by encouraging segregated patterns of residen-
tial development that further segregated neighborhood schools.93 
Justices Douglas and Powell, writing separately in Keyes, 
carried this reasoning about the substantive interests of Equal 
Protection to its logical limits. They argued that the distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation should be abandoned. 
Douglas stressed that what matters, constitutionally, is not 
whether the state had a formal intent to segregate, but simply 
whether state action caused patterns of school segregation that 
could have been avoided had "affirmative action" been taken.94 
A constitutional violation occurs whether school segregation is 
ring) (acknowledging "compelling governmental interest in redressing the effects of past 
discrimination") (emphasis added). 
90. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) (arguing that a city may usc 
race to allocate contracts to avoid passive participation in discrimination by local con-
struction industry). 
91. Green, 391 U.S. at440-41. 
92. Swann v. Charlottc-Mccklcnbcrg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 21 (observing that 
school districts often "promote segregated residential patterns" in their choices of where 
to close and open schools). 
93. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,201-02. Keyes pointedly declined to rule 
on the merits of the lower court's determination that even when courts could nul order 
desegregation in cases of mere de facto segregation, the Constitution nevertheless re-
quired that school districts operate integrated schools even when the segregation is only 
de facto.ld. at 214 n.l8, citing 313 F. Supp. 73, 96. 
94. /d. at 214. 
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due to the intentional policy of the school district, or its passive 
transmission of the effects of the segregative policies of other 
agents- for example, racially restrictive covenants, or "racial 
ghettos" built with public funds by urban development authori-
ties.95 Justice Powell extended this definition of state action to 
include state acquiescence in the impact of private housing 
choices on the racial composition of schools. Swann already re-
quired school districts convicted of de jure segregation to remedy 
not merely that portion of segregation traceable to its intentional 
segregation, but segregation due to private housing choices that 
it had encouraged or facilitated. It would be constitutionally in-
consistent to refuse to extend this latter requirement to school 
districts that had not also been convicted of segregative intent, 
although they facilitated private racial discrimination (white 
flight) or transmitted its effects. 96 To vindicate each student's con-
stitutional right to education in an integrated setting,97 "school 
boards have a duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated con-
ditions by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. "98 
The Court declined to follow Powell's and Douglas' opin-
ions. But its reasons for doing so were based on reservations 
about the scope of judicial powers of enforcement, not on views 
about the constitutional interests of other state bodies in reme-
dying segregation. In Milliken, the Court overturned a judicially 
imposed interdistrict remedy for Detroit's de jure segregation, in 
part because it would make the District Court "a de facto 'legis-
lative authority' ... and then the 'school superintendent' for the 
entire area. "99 The courts lacked the competence to administer 
school districts to the extent required to effect the proposed 
remedy. They also lacked the legitimacy to do so, given that such 
administration would require them to make political decisions 
(concerning, for example, the allocation of local tax dollars 
across city boundaries) traditionally held to be the proper prov-
ince of elected officials. Local control of education is a para-
95. /d. at 216 ("When a State forces, aids, or abets, or helps create a racial 
"neighborhood," it is a travesty of justice to treat that neighborhood as ... free from the 
taint of state action.") 
96. /d. at 227 (''Public schools arc creatures of the State, and whether the segrega-
tion is statc-crcalL:d or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to 
constitutional principle."). 
97. /d. 
98. /d. at 236 
99. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974) ("This is a task which few, if 
any, judges arc qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of control 
of schools through their elected representatives"). 
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mount consideration that limits the degree to which courts will 
find school districts responsible for equal protection violations. 
The same concern for local control pervades Board of Edu-
cation v. Dowell. 100 In Dowell, the Court permitted a desegrega-
tion decree to be dissolved and a locally designed student reas-
signment plan to be adopted, even if this immediately led to the 
de facto resegregation of schools, provided that the school dis-
trict had proved its good faith by complying with the original de-
cree for enough time, and it had eliminated "the vestiges of past 
discrimination" "to the extent practicable." 101 It reasoned that 
the federal system allocated to Courts only a temporary power 
to issue injunctions requiring desegregation. "Local control over 
the education of children allows citizens to participate in deci-
sionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can 
fit local needs." 102 Hence, 
Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities 
have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of 
time properly recognizes that "necessary concern for the im-
portant values of local control of public school systems dic-
tates that a federal court's regulatory control of such systems 
not extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of 
past intentional discrimination." See [Milliken II], 433 U.S. at 
280-82. 103 
On its face, Dowell proposed two distinct criteria for when a de-
segregation decree should be dissolved: when the local school 
district has complied with it "for a reasonable period of time" 
and when it has actually remedied "the effects of past intentional 
discrimination." The substantive Equal Protection norm is, of 
course, the latter. However, as Justice Scalia argued in Freeman 
v. Pitts, the extent of judicial enforcement of this norm is deter-
mined almost entirely by the Court's presumptions about the 
causal connections between prior de jure and current de facto 
segregation. 104 Dowell and Freeman shift the presumption to-
ward school boards, in the interest of protecting the Tenth 
Amendment powers of the states, as delegated to the local 
boards. This means that Courts must presume that, once the 
state has complied with desegregation orders for a period of 
time, demographic shifts during that period should not be attrib-
100. 498 u.s. 237. 
101. /d. at250. 
102. /d. at248. 
103. /d. 
104. 503 u.s. 467,503. 
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uted to prior state action even when they exacerbate de facto 
segregation, and even when they are caused by racially moti-
vated blockbusting and white flight. 105 As Freeman stressed, "the 
ultimate objective has not chan~ed- to return school districts to 
the control of local authorities." 06 For this reason, Courts should 
hold school boards accountable only when their action is the 
. f d f . 107 proxtmate cause o e acto segregatwn. 
These are doctrines about the burdens of proof, not about 
substantive equal protection norms. They are justified by institu-
tional considerations about the limits of judicial power vis a vis 
other state bodies. It follows that they cannot be invoked to limit 
the power of other state bodies to remedy segregation. 108 To the 
contrary, their whole point is to expand the power of schools and 
other state bodies to use their discretion in running the schools, 
including their discretion in assigning students to schools. For 
example, in Milliken, no constitutional principle would have rre-
vented the state of Michigan from consolidating the 54 school 
districts in the Detroit metropolitan area into a single district. 
The consolidated district would then have been free to imple-
ment a comprehensive desegregation plan including all of the 
I 05. !d. at 480 (observing the de facto segregation of De Kalb County School System was 
caused in part by blockbusting); /d. at 506 (Scalia, concurring, noting role of white !light). 
106. !d. at 490 ("Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest 
practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental sys-
tem. When the school district and all state entities participating with it in operating the 
schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be held account-
able to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary course."). 
I 07. /d. at 491. Scalia also argued that after such a lapse of time, it is unreasonable to 
suppose that there is any significant causal connection between past de jure segregation 
and present de facto segregation. /d. at 506. This is erroneous. Current patterns of ex-
treme black segregation could not exist in the absence of the segregation earlier achieved 
through massive federal, state, and municipal action. For, given blacks' current prefer-
ence to live in integrated neighborhoods, white !light alone could not succeed in creating 
observed patterns of overwhelmingly white neighborhoods, unless some such neighbor-
hoods had already been created through prior action, and maintained through continuing 
discrimination. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 96-97. Moreover, prior state 
action has actively promoted black stigmatization and antiblack prejudice in society at 
large, and therefore is causally responsible for white llight. 
I 08. This is an application of Lawrence Sager's famous argument that some constitu-
tional norms arc systematically undcrcnforccd by the courts due to institutional concerns, 
such as federalism, or the courts' lack of competence and legitimacy in domains tradi-
tionally managed by the other branches of government. In such cases, Sager argued, the 
constitutional norms arc "legally valid to their full conceptual limits," although the re-
sponsibility for enforcing them to those limits must lie with other state bodies. Lawrence 
Sager, Fair Measure: the Legal Status of Underenforced Constitwiona/ Norms, 91 HARV. 
L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978). On the view argued here, any state body has a compelling in-
terest, on grounds of equal protection, in remedying de facto segregation in which any 
state actiOn played a causal role, even if that role is too indirect to entitle a Federal Court 
to order it to act. 
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schools within its borders, as a remedy for the illegal segregation 
found in Detroit's schools. 
In other rulings, the Court has recognized the distinction be-
tween the powers of Federal Courts and of other state bodies to 
promote integration. In Bustop v. Board of Education, students 
who were to be bused pursuant to a massive desegregation rem-
edy ordered by state court under California's equal protection 
clause asked the Supreme Court to issue a stay, on the ground 
that individuals have a "federal right" to be "free from racial 
quotas." 109 Justice Rehnquist refused to do so, arguing that Cali-
fornia's status as a distinct sovereign entity entitled it to enforce 
stronger equal protection norms in desegregation cases, under its 
own state constitution, than Federal courts can require. 110 The 
Court has also held that the Federal equal protection clause for-
bids states from barring local governments from using busing to 
remedy mere de facto segregation.''' 
Grutter represents the culmination of this line of thought. 
The first successor cases to Brown articulate the substantive 
Equal Protection norm: that states that have ever practiced seg-
regation (which, as Keyes observed, means all states) must rem-
edy its effects and avoid passive participation in the racially dis-
criminatory choices of private parties, even when these choices 
are legal. The desegregation cases from Milliken on limit the 
scope of judicial powers to enforce this norm, in the interest of 
respecting the autonomy of other state bodies to formulate their 
own educational policies. Grutter holds that this autonomy in-
cludes the power to use racial means to integrate the institutions 
of civil society-whether to remedy the de facto segregation that 
would otherwise occur (as an effect of past de jure segregation or 
private discrimination) or as a means to promote equal opportu-
nity and democratic ideals. As Grutter affirms, "Effective par-
ticipation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic 
life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indi-
visible, is to be realized." 112 
109. 439 u.s. 1380, 1382 (1978). 
110. !d. at 1383 ("While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California 
was required by the United States Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this 
case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action"). 
111. Washington v. Seattle School District No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down 
a state initiative forbidding local governments from implementing school busing for pur-
poses of racial integration). Cf Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (striking 
down New York law forbidding appointed school boards from using race-based student 
assignments to remedy de facto segregation). 
112. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at332. 
